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i 
ABSTRACT 
 
The American Heart Association (AHA) estimates that there are approximately 200,000 
in-hospital cardiac arrests (IHCA) annually with low rates of survival to discharge at about 22%. 
Training programs for cardiac arrest teams, also termed code teams, have been recommended 
by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) and in the AHA's consensus statement to help improve these 
dismal survival rates. Historically, training programs in the medical field are procedural in nature 
and done at the individual level, despite the fact that healthcare providers frequently work in 
teams. The rigidity of procedural training can cause habituation and lead to poor team 
performance if the situation does not match the original training circumstances. Despite the need 
for team training, factors such as logistics, time, personnel coordination, and financial constraints 
often hinder resuscitation team training. This research was a three-step process of: 1) 
development of a metric specific for the evaluation of code team performance, 2) development of 
a communication model that targeted communication and leadership during a code blue 
resuscitation, and 3) training and evaluation of the code team leader using the communication 
model. This research forms a basis to accomplish a broad vision of improving outcomes of IHCA 
events by applying conceptual and methodological strategies learned from collaborative and 
inter-disciplinary science of teams. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The American Heart Association (AHA) estimates that in-hospital cardiac arrests (IHCA) 
range from 3.8 to 13.1 per 1000 admissions (Morrison et al., 2013). This equates to roughly 
200,000 cardiac arrests annually. In 2004, the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) 
launched the “100,000 Lives Campaign”. This promotion was a challenge to the healthcare 
community within hospitals to reinforce its obligation to make patient safety its highest priority 
(Berwick, Calkins, McCannon, & Hackbarth, 2006). The campaign identified three main concerns 
that needed to be improved upon during resuscitation events; failure to plan, failure to 
communicate, and failure to recognize a patient’s deteriorating condition (failure to rescue). To 
address these concerns, hospitals focused on implementing multidisciplinary teams trained in 
advanced cardiac life support (ACLS) that could hurry to the bedside of deteriorating patients with 
the intention of preventing respiratory and/or cardiac arrest leading to improve patient outcomes. 
History of Code Blue Resuscitiation  
When these teams are aiding patients in distress, the ABC (Airway, Breathing, 
Circulation) mnemonic specifies the sequence of steps necessary in the resuscitative effort. A 
brief historical review of this mnemonic begins with the management of the airway which, was 
first described in 1540 when Vesalius placed an artificial airway, a reed, into the tracheas of 
animals (Shiber, 2016).  It was not until 1871 when tracheostomy tubes were used shortly 
followed by the use endotracheal tubes in 1889. One of the first modern day airway management 
papers was published back in 1958 and discussed the topic of how to minimization the 
complications of endotracheal intubation (Hamelberg, Welch, Siddall, & Jacoby, 1958).  
Suggestions of resuscitative breathing efforts date back much further to 1300 B.C. with 
Hebrew midwives breathing for babies and references in the Old Testament about the Prophet 
Elisha reviving a child by putting his mouth on the child’s mouth and breathing life back into him 
(Trubuhovich, 2006). In the 1500’s Parcellus used a bellows to artificially breath air into the noses 
and mouths of patients. Also describing a method of artificially breathing, The Silvester Method  
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involves an arm lift with chest and abdominal compression to simulate breathing. During the polio 
epidemic Drs. Elam and Safer used manual ventilation to breath for patients and coined the term 
rescue breathing; the Red Cross endorsed it in 1960 (Safar & Elam, 1958). 
The use of cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and defibrillation as part of resuscitative 
efforts occurred in the beginning of the 17th century. Early accounts regarding the use of external 
cardiac compression by stimulating a dove’s heart using a finger was documented by Harvey in 
1628, again using cats in 1878, followed by its use with dogs by George Crile in 1904 (Hurt, 
2005).  Application of external chest compressions was documented by Keen, (1904) when 
human cases of successful return of a pulse following external cardiac compression was 
documented. Kouwenhoven, Jude, and Knickerbocker, (1960) published what is considered the 
landmark paper regarding the application of external chest compressions and the American Heart 
Association endorsed CPR in 1963. Defibrillation is defined as he use of a carefully controlled 
electric shock, administered either through a device on the exterior of the chest wall or directly to 
the exposed heart muscle, to normalize the rhythm of the heart or restart it (“defibrillation,” n.d.). 
It’s use dates back to 1775 when it was used on birds, followed by the first modern day 
defibrillation demonstrated by Zoll in 1956 and then a safer, more effective defibrillator developed 
in 1962.  
The first organized effort to respond to cardiac arrests can be traced back to Amsterdam 
in 1767 (Johnson, 1773).  Authors suggested restraining from the current practices in 
resuscitation, such as, rolling a body over a cask or hanging the drowned person from their feet to 
allow the water to be expelled the body and instead recommended alternative therapies such as; 
forcing air into the drown person’s mouth, tickling the person’s throat, and stimulating breath by 
the fumigation of tobacco smoke into the person’s airway. Advanced cardiac life support (ACLS) 
was developed in 1979 at the Third National Conference on CPR and consisted of formalized 
steps and sets of interventions involved in the treatment of a patient near or in cardiac arrest. The 
ACLS certification involves training in airway management, reading and interpreting 
electrocardiograms (ECGs), placing intravenous access, and understanding emergency  
 
 
3 
pharmacological treatments. Typically, possession of the ACLS certification is required to be a  
member of a hospital’s resuscitative team.  
In the hospital setting, organized teams are ad hoc teams used to respond and assist 
patients requiring resuscitative efforts. These teams are referred to as many things, such as: 
cardiac code teams, code teams, code blue teams, medical emergency team (MET), rapid 
response team (RRT), rapid medical response team (RMRT), cardiac care team (CCT), critical 
care outreach team (CCOT), extended rapid response system (E-RRS), and a rover team, but no 
common name to describe these team has been adopted (DeVita, Schaefer, Lutz, Wang, & 
Dongilli, 2005). For consistency, we will refer to these teams as code teams. Outcome measures 
regarding performance and efficacy of these code teams are typically mortality rates at discharge, 
the reduction of cardiac arrests occurring outside of the intensive care unit (ICU), and reduction of 
patients transferred to the ICU. The data on team performance is focused on patient outcomes 
and does not suggest any true measurement of the team’s performance.  
Despite advances in the science of cardiopulmonary resuscitation over the past several 
decades, the odds of neurologically intact survival from in-hospital cardiac arrest (IHCA) remains 
low (Clarke, Carolina Apesoa-Varano, & Barton, 2016). Successful resuscitation following IHCA 
requires the immediate and coordinated efforts of multiple providers, often with different types of 
training and levels of experience in dealing with IHCA. Although resuscitation guidelines, such as 
ACLS, provide a logical, sequential, algorithmic approach (see Figure 1), it mainly emphasizes 
technical tasks performed by individual rescuers and does not address issues involving a team 
(Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 2000).   
Several solutions have been offered to improve interdisciplinary training from the team 
strategies and tools to enhance performance and patient safety (TEAMSTEPPS) to simulation-
based training (Han et al., 2014). Code team training programs that incorporate simulations have 
been recommended by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) since 1999 and reinforced in 2013 with the 
AHA’s consensus statement for improving cardiac resuscitation outcomes (Kohn, Corrigan, 
Donaldson, America, & (U.S.), 2000; Meaney et al., 2013). 
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Figure 1 Example of ACLS Algorithm from “Part 7.3: Management of Symptomatic Bradycardia 
and Tachycardia,” (2005). 
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Conclusion 
Clearly the history of rescucitation is extensive but the outcomes have not proved idyllic. 
Despite hospitals incorporating these strategies, the quality of team performance continues to be 
variable and teamwork deficiencies exist. Therefore, the primary purpose of this dissertation was 
to evaluate code team performances in the simulated setting to develop a way to improve the 
team’s performance. To do this a performance metric was developed that evaluates the code 
team based on the team’s performance, taking into account factors that promote better patient 
outcomes. Although the AHA mandates a metric for team responses to IHCA as part of the “Get 
with the Guidelines” it contains a scarcity of data related to teamwork and the team’s performance 
during the code response (Bradley et al., 2012). The new metric was used to devise a training 
program, targeting weaknesses identified by the metric. Following training, evaluation of the 
team’s performance during a simulated code blue event (SCBE) was scored using the developed 
metric to determine if the training improved team performance. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
What is a Code Team? 
 To determine efficacy of a team one must define what a team is, the tasks it performs, 
and what is needed to measure team performance. Swezey and Salas (1992) define a team as a 
“distinguishable set of two or more individuals who interact dynamically, adaptively, and 
interdependently; who share common goals and purposes; and who have specific roles or 
functions to perform” (pp. 3-29). As previously stated, these teams are referred to as many things, 
such as: the medical emergency team (MET), rapid response team (RRT), rapid medical 
response team (RMRT), code teams, code blue teams, cardiac care team (CCT), critical care 
outreach team (CCOT), extended rapid response system (E-RRS), and a rover team, but no 
common name to describe the team has been adopted (DeVita et al., 2005). Whereas the 
purpose of code teams is reasonably distinct, team composition, member roles, and 
responsibilities of members are mentioned fleetingly in a majority of the research regarding the 
efficacy of the teams. Currently, ideal team member composition is not mentioned in any study 
and the team’s tasks can vary.  
Code teams are ad hoc teams, not intact teams, so determining a training strategy that is 
best suited to improve team performance is difficult. Because of the ad hoc nature of these teams 
it is also a logistic challenge in training an entire team all at once. By definition code team 
formation and response within hospitals involves “a rapid formation, abbreviated lifespan, and 
often limited experience working together previously” (Weaver, Dy, & Rosen, 2014). Whereas 
most code teams are organized in hospitals based on the member’s level of education (the 
physician is the team leader, the respiratory therapists assist the resident with the airway, the 
pharmacist gets the medications) individual team members could have limited or no experience 
working together on the code team. Ad hoc code teams are associated with poor performance in 
terms of critical care processes, such as CPR performance and timely defibrillation (Rea, Olsufka, 
Yin, Maynard, & Cobb, 2014; Marc et al., 2009).  
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Code teams are typically used, if not exclusively, to respond, assess, and provide 
medical care to a patient experiencing a medical crisis. Code teams are usually large ad hoc 
teams of nine to ten members that respond following an overhead call out for a “code blue” when 
a patient is already in respiratory and/or cardiac arrest. The medical emergency team (MET) is a 
bit different in composition and purpose. First described in groundbreaking work from researchers 
in Australia, the intended objective of the MET was responding to emergency calls where it was 
determined, based on specific trigger criteria, a patient’s condition was deteriorating but, has not 
yet reach respiratory and/or cardiac arrest (Lee, Bishop, Hillman, & Daffurn, 1995). Although not 
consistently described in the literature, members of these teams routinely include doctors, 
registered nurses (RN), and respiratory therapists (RT) with advanced life support skills who are 
capable of providing critical medical care to a patient whose condition was worsening.  
The idea that some sort of a rapid response system (RRS) initiating a response from a 
MET to help a patient differs from the historical use of the “code blue team” that responds when a 
patient is already in full respiratory and/or cardiac arrest. Because of the distinction in team 
member numbers and patient status response criteria these two teams are compared in in Figure 
2. Both are interdisciplinary teams that respond to medical emergencies and usually only respond 
to areas located outside the intensive care unit (ICU) environment. Outcome measures of team 
effectiveness are typically patient focused and are commonly mortality rates at discharge and 
reduction of cardiac arrest occurring outside of the ICU. Neither of these standards actually 
quantifies the entire team’s performance and furthermore, neither identifies areas of deficiencies 
where performance can be improved with training interventions. Code teams are a special kind of 
ad hoc medical team, forming quickly, working in stressful situation, with little time to reflect on  
team performance following a code response. These characteristics present both an evaluation 
and training challenges. It is likely a specific metric coupled with a special type of training will be 
needed to improve team performance. 
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Figure 2  
Code team members compared with medical emergency team members 
 
 
 
RN – Registered nurse  
RT – Respiratory therapist 
 
  
Empirical Evaluation of Code Teams 
Evaluation of a code team should be centered on the purpose and objective of the team 
not just a patient-based outcome metric. For instance, to determine and evaluate the impact 
medical teams had on the IHCA rate for non-ICU patients, referred to in this article as a rapid  
medical response team (RMRT), researchers out of California retrospectively compared before 
(preRMRT) and after (postRMRT) data to determine if a reduction in code occurrences in non-
ICU patients following RMRT implementation could be demonstrated (Gould, 2007). In addition to 
non-ICU code rates, outcome measurements used in this research included mortality rates and  
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unplanned transfers of patients into the ICU. The RMRT consisted of an ICU charge RN whose 
role was team leader and an RT who was responsible for the respiratory needs of the patient. No 
physician was designated on the team, but the article suggested one would be available if called 
for consultation. The patient’s primary RN would remain at the bedside while the RMRT assessed 
the patient but their role, if any, in the RMRT was not defined. Training and education regarding 
the RMRT seemed procedural and consisted mainly of understanding the logistics and objectives 
of the RMRT with no apparent focus on team training. The article pointed out the importance of 
communication regarding the initial call to activate the RMRT and suggested that failure to 
communicate led to many adverse events. This offers a potential area of focus for training. The 
data only included RMRT responses to the bedside of non-ICU patients. The study found a 
decrease in non-ICU code rate from 92 to 79 following RMRT implementation however, the 
overall mortality rate was unchanged.  
At times, teams are used not as a typical code team, but more as a code prevention 
team. Although emergency patient care is the general commonality between the medical teams, 
some have additional responsibilities. Nevertheless, most determinations of efficiency are patient-
status based. Shearer et al. (2012) carried out a study across four metropolitan teaching hospitals 
in Melbourne, Australia to identify patients who met the physiological criteria or triggers for 
activation of the MET but, for whom the team’s response was not activated. This situation is 
termed a “missed RRS call”. This data collection was accomplished by a patient chart review 
between 1-hour periods and compared the patient charts to the previous 24 hours of observation. 
A strength of this study was that the researchers were specific in their methods and excluded the 
patient population that was already in a critical care environment (ICU, emergency room, 
operating room). Chart evaluation for all unplanned ICU admissions and cardiac arrests during an 
eight-week time period was reviewed to identify any patients who met the code team call criteria 
for a minimum of four hours in the previous 24-hour period to cardiac arrest or ICU admission. 
Qualitative data was obtained by interviewing the clinical staff involved in all of the “missed RRS 
calls” to help determine the barriers to MET activation. Five hundred and seventy charts were  
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reviewed with 23 patients fulfilling MET call criteria. However, only 13 MET calls were  
activated, meaning 10 patients met the call criteria but the team was not activated. From the 
interviews, which were very limited, the researchers identified sociocultural factors and intra-
professional hierarchies, such as feeling they had the situation under control, no ICU bed 
available, and poor communication by the medical team, as reasons why the call was not made 
and the MET was not activated.  
In an attempt to overcome the theme of delayed activation and underutilization of code 
teams as exhibited in the research published by Gould, 2007; Howell et al., 2012; and Shearer et 
al., 2012, researchers from an 813-bed tertiary teaching hospital in Seoul, Korea examined the 
hypothesis that more patients could be saved if the code team was activated in an automatic 
manner (Kwak et al., 2014). The Hanyang Rapid Response Team (HaRRT), likely named after 
the Hanyang University Hospital where the research was performed, is described as an extended 
rapid response system (E-RRS) that searches for patients at risk of deteriorating or coding, rather 
than wait for a RRS activation to initiate a response. Using a computerized alert system with a 
electronic chart sharing system, lists of patients perceived as “at-risk” were identified based on 
the typical code team activation criteria using abnormal vital sign criteria along with laboratory 
findings and clinical manifestations. The E-RRS could either be activated by an emergency call 
from the primary medical personnel attending to the patient or activated by the screening from an 
E-RRS team member. The team was available during the hours of 07:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. daily 
and consisted of an intensivist, an interventional cardiologist, an internal medicine resident, and 
an ICU RN. There was also a night duty (8:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.) internal medicine resident that 
called the rest of the team in if needed during evening hours. For a 2- year period IHCAs were 
evaluated; with the first year considered the prior to E-RRS implementation and the second year 
the E-RRS was in place. The paper suggests that a typical code team was not in place prior to 
the implementation of this E-RRS. The E-RRS missed 22 IHCAs but with the way the team  
searches for at-risk patients using their criteria, it seems inherent that patients who go from stable 
to cardiac arrest could be missed. Moreover, software development needs accompanied with  
 
 
11 
such a seemingly labor and staff intensive team seems unrealistic for wide spread  
implementation in an already logistically challenged realm of ad hoc code teams. Especially when 
some have suggested code teams do not reduce mortality and may just increase hospital costs 
with patients requiring a higher level of care following a code team response with the subsequent 
transfer of patients into the ICU (Young, 2010; Rashid et al., 2014).  
In conclusion, despite the implementation of code teams in countless hospitals the overall 
survival from respiratory and/or cardiac arrest has remained unimproved for decades (Peberdy et 
al., 2003). Patient outcomes and a code team’s effectiveness are likely connected. However, 
there is need to assess a team’s performance independently of patient outcome in order to 
identify areas in which improvement is needed and the type of training needed to improve the 
team performance and conceivably lead to improved patient outcomes.  
Challenges Involved with Training Code Teams 
Training during ACLS courses describes the value of good team leadership, but no 
structured curriculum for leadership training currently exists. Although ACLS guidelines provide a  
logical and sequential algorithmic approach to resuscitation, they have mainly emphasized  
technical tasks performed by individual rescuers and have not addressed issues of adapting to  
the complex nature of most actual resuscitations. In fact, evidence that ACLS courses improve 
patient outcomes following IHCA is minimal (Hamilton, 2005; Semeraro, Signore, & Cerchiari, 
2006; Mancini et al., 2010; Wolfe et al., 2014).  
Training entire ad hoc code teams can be challenging with high costs, difficulty in 
coordinating a time that works for multiple team members, and pulling staff away from the 
bedside to perform simulated training. Simulation is regularly used in the healthcare setting to 
evaluate code teams (Mondrup et al., 2011). The advantages of simulated emergencies include: 
no patient risk, errors can be allowed to occur, psychomotor skills can be assessed, teamwork,  
leadership, and communication can be explored, and recording of the sessions is possible (Lloyd, 
Kendall, Meek, & Younge, 2007).The use of simulation has proven to be a powerful training 
strategy for team-based health care and provide excellent opportunities to improve team  
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performance. It has been suggested that the use of high fidelity patient simulation has the biggest 
effect on improving physician education, which could lead to improved patient outcomes (Sahu & 
Lata, 2010). On the contrary, a recent study of simulation-based code training for physician team 
leaders found it yielded no significant improvement in the following key processes of cardiac 
arrest care: time to initiation of CPR, time to administration of cardiac medication and time to 
defibrillation (Han et al., 2014). This is an example of how just simply running codes is not 
training. Specific strategies must be applied in order to improve the team’s performance. 
Specialized leadership training is more logistically attainable and practical way to conceivably  
influence and improve overall team performance. This type of training would not be the typical  
training seen currently in the literature, but instead a method of training the leader as a 
coordination agent who will subtly train other team members during codes. The leader is a 
constant in all code teams and leader specific training offers a viable option as a training strategy. 
Likely, an important component of this will be the leader’s ability to coordination and effectively 
communication information to the entire team.  
Measuring a code team’s performance should include metrics for timing and sequencing 
of events coupled with the evaluation of behaviors that promote effective performance, not a 
measurement base exclusively on patient outcomes. Unfortunately, standardization of outcome 
measures for code teams does not exist. Further, the ability to generalize different studies in 
order to parse out a training strategy in high performing teams is difficult because the majority of 
research is from single-centered studies, the team member roles, responsibilities, and 
composition are different, or not defined, and the data elements are not standardized (Beitler, 
Link, Bails, Hurdle, & Chong, 2011; Chan et al., 2008; Cooper, Janghorbani, & Cooper, 2006; 
Hatler, 2009; Karpman et al., 2013; Kenward, Castle, Hodgetts, & Shaikh, 2004). In an attempt to 
overcome this problem, the Medical Early Response and Interventions Therapy (MERIT) study 
performed a cluster-randomized control trial that evaluated the MET system in 23 hospitals in 
Australia to determine whether a reduction in cardiac arrests, unplanned ICU admissions, and 
deaths occurred after its implementation (Chen, Flabouris, Bellomo, Hillman, & Finfer, 2008). As  
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a note, the MET nomenclature is predominately used in studies out of Australia and will be used 
to identify the teams in this section. Based on the statistical analysis by the MERIT investigators, 
no significant reductions in the study categories were found. Because the MERIT used and  
compared before and after statistical effects following implementation of medical teams at 
numerous hospital systems it was thought the differences between facilities and how they 
implemented the medical teams could have skewed the data outcomes. To overcome this system 
dependent variable  Chen, Flabouris, Bellomo, Hillman, and Finfer (2009) re-evaluated the 
MERIT data using linear and quadratic-modeling techniques to determine whether the statistical 
analysis tool used could alter the study findings. When regression modeling techniques were 
used to analyze the data, a reduction in cardiac arrests, unplanned ICU admissions, and deaths 
was seen following the implementation of the MET system. 
Perhaps in one of the most comprehensive meta-analysis published regarding the 
efficacy of code teams to improve patient outcomes, 18 studies between January 1950 through 
November 31, 2008, which included a sample size of more than 1,200,000 admissions, aimed to 
assess the influence code teams had on overall hospital mortality rates (Chan, Jain, Nallmothu, 
Berg, & Sasson, 2010). A strength of this meta-analysis was its utilization of three inclusion 
criteria and search methods, which encompassed: data extraction standards, criteria used to 
assess the quality of a searched article, and data synthesis.  Despite a reduction of 33.8% in non-
ICU cardiopulmonary arrests, overall hospital mortality rates were unchanged following 
implementation of code teams. It should be noted that this meta-analysis included a pediatric 
patient category, which if isolated, did show a reduction in hospital mortality rates. The cause of 
pediatric IHCA is most commonly attributed to respiratory failure, which may contribute to 
misleading code team successes in mortality rate reductions (Berg, Nadkarni, Zuercher, & Berg, 
2008). Further skewed success rate data in pediatrics may also be contributed to the lack of 
comorbidities in the pediatric population as compared to adults (Nadkarni et al., 2006). Code 
team evaluation may need to be evaluated based on hospital location and specialty, such as rural 
hospital versus urban trauma center, obstetrics, pediatrics, and the post-surgical patient  
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population, to determine its true efficacy in mortality rate reduction. 
At the time of its publication, research by Beitler et al., (2011) was one of the largest 
studies that demonstrated a reduction in mortality rates following implementation of code teams.  
The researchers hypothesized that an emphasis on using clinical judgment regarding patient 
condition along with activation criteria, such as a patient’s vital signs, would lead to more 
activation of code teams, which in turn, could lead to improved clinical outcomes. Results showed 
a hospital-wide decrease in mortality from 15.5 to 13.74 per 1,000 discharges following code 
team implementation with the number of hospital deaths decreasing by 139. Non-ICU code rates 
also decreased following code team implementation dropping from 3.28 to 1.62 per 1,000 
discharges.  
This demonstrated improvement of outcomes following code team implementation is not 
typically seen in the literature (Chan et al., 2010). Chan et al., (2010) attributed the improvement 
in the Beitler et al., (2011)  study to wide use and activation of code teams with contributing 
factors including: familiarity of the PGY-3 as team leader and salaried attending physicians 
promoting a culture of shared patient care responsibility. Another factor was the use of nurses’ 
clinical judgment as a trigger to activate the code team which led to the nurses feeling 
“empowered”. This suggests that sociocultural barriers exist as they relate to code team 
activation (Tee, Calzavacca, Licari, Goldsmith, & Bellomo, 2008). Stereotypic perceptions that 
professionals hold regarding members of other disciplines may increase the hierarchical divisions 
and have detrimental effects on inter-professional collaboration during a code team response 
(Mariano, 2006). This hierarchy in medicine should even be taken into account when training 
code teams.  
Evaluation of efficacy of code teams should be an ongoing process and was 
demonstrated in a lengthy study in 2007 researchers evaluated the incidences, outcomes, and 
potentially avoidable causes of IHCA in an academic hospital with medical teams that had been 
in place for 16 years (Galhotra, DeVita, & Simmons, 2007).  The data collection and event 
analysis for this study was done through an in-depth chart review.  
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The overall cardiopulmonary arrest rate did decrease from 5.4/1000 admissions to 3.26/1000 in 
the 2005 study year. However, only 26 patients survived to discharge and no mention of overall 
mortality rate compared the statistics of before RRS implementation was specified. Changes  
were made to help improve outcomes based on the findings of this study but none were related to 
team training limiting any possibility for its implementation in other hospital systems as a way to 
improve patient outcomes or team efficacy measures.  However, with no formal training strategy 
mentioned, its usefulness as a tool to direct training the code team is diminutive and makes clear 
the need for formal team training.  
Team Performance Measurement 
As previously stated, outcome measures of code team effectiveness are typically 
mortality rates at discharge and reduction of cardiac arrest occurring outside of the ICU, neither of 
which suggest any true measurement of team performance. Researchers address this issue as it 
relates to IHCA survival rates looking at hospital variation to identify areas needing improvement, 
as well as recognizing the factors at particular hospitals that contribute to increased survival 
following IHCA so that these “best practices” could be used to improve other hospital outcomes 
(Merchant et al., 2014). The data source used was the American Heart Association’s Get with the  
Guidelines-Resuscitation (GWTG-R) registry.  This multicenter cohort study included adult 
patients enrolled in the registry from January 1, 2001 through December 31, 2010. As per the 
standard, the outcome measure was survival at time of hospital discharge. Although a variation 
rate of survival following IHCA of up to 42% was found depending on which hospital the patient 
was admitted to, what contributed to this variation, could not be determined. However, the 
authors did propose that utilization of a medical team prior to respiratory and/or cardiac arrest 
could be a contributing factor in successful patient outcomes. It would be interesting if similar 
statistical analysis were performed on before-and-after RRS implementations studies to 
determine what factors played a role in their success in reducing patient mortality rates. Some 
studies have demonstrated that poor code team performance is associated with poor patient 
outcomes following cardiac arrest (Clarke, Carolina Apesoa-Varano, & Barton, 2016). Improving 
 
16 
code team performance requires the ability to evaluate that performance. The tools currently used 
to evaluate these teams are discussed next.  
The Team Emergency Assessment Measure  
In a study specific for teamwork performance during resuscitation attempts, an Australian 
research group aimed to develop a tool to measure teamwork during emergency resuscitation 
(Cooper, et al., 2010). The Team Emergency Assessment Measure (TEAM) (see Appendix A) 
was developed in five stages with the objective of providing a teamwork assessment tool that 
observers could use to evaluate team effectiveness during resuscitation events in both the 
simulated and clinical settings.  The rating system consists of 11 items that are rated from 0 to 4 
(never/hardly ever to always/nearly always, respectively) with a 12th scale that is rated 0 to 10 
and is the overall global rating of the team’s performance. The TEAM was tested using second 
year medical and nursing students who completed an intermediate life support class the day 
before. They were placed in teams of five and observed in real time using high fidelity 
mannequins. Experts reviewed this tool and found it to be valid, reliable, and possibly useful for  
clinicians to measure their teamwork during resuscitation. 
Cooper and Cant, (2014) expanded the use of the TEAM in a 2014 publication. Their 
original study looked at teamwork in the scenario of emergency resuscitation.  Applying the same 
teamwork assessment tool, they instead observed teamwork performance in the deteriorating 
patient setting. Two studies were performed with one looking at teamwork in 97 final year nursing 
students from three Australian universities and the other using 44 RNs (medical or surgical 
nurses) from a regional Australian hospital. The 97 nursing students were placed in groups of 
three and two trained clinicians rated their performances in three 8-minute deteriorating patient 
scenarios using a standardized patient. The registered nurses were also placed in teams of three 
and required to first identify, and then manage a deteriorating patient. The study indicated validity 
and reliability when measuring teamwork skills using TEAM during a deteriorating patient setting 
of both final year nursing students and registered nurses.  
 
 
 
17 
Observational Skill-Based Clinical Assessment Tool for Resuscitation  
The observational skill-based clinical assessment tool for resuscitation (OSCAR) (see 
Appendix B for communication portion) was developed with the objective of assessing team  
behaviors and non-technical skills during a cardiac arrest attempt for each of the core team 
members (Walker et al., 2011). The researchers in this study defined non-technical skill behaviors 
as: communication, cooperation, coordination, monitoring, leadership and decision-making. The 
OSCAR tool rates each six behaviors on a scale of 0 to 6 separately for the three distinct 
members of the team. Unfortunately, OSCAR does not evaluate teamwork as a behavior, it is not 
a behavior they defined as a non-technical skill, and the team is not assessed as a whole with 
this tool.  
The Mayo High Performance Teamwork Scale  
Not specific to teams during resuscitation, the Mayo High Performance Teamwork Scale 
(MHPTS) rates leadership, teamwork, communication and adaptability using 16 categories rated 
from 0 to 2 (never or rarely to consistently, respectively) (Malec et al., 2007). This scale is more of 
a crisis resource management tool than a team performance during resuscitation teamwork 
metric (see Appendix C).   
A Dichotomous Checklist  
 Originally develop as a performance and assessment tool but converted into a checklist 
Andersen, Jensen, Lippert, Østergaard, and Klausen, (2010) designed a dichotomous list of 
yes/no responses to aid in the assessment of learning of cardiac arrest teams (see Appendix D). 
Because of its heavy focus on medicine and lack of team cognitive process measurements this 
checklist is not used as a team performance metric in this research. The three evaluation tools 
applied to code teams during this experiment are compared in Table 1.  
 Although the AHA mandated metrics for IHCA is collected as part of “Get with the 
Guidelines”, there is a scarcity of data related to teamwork and team performance. While training 
courses like ACLS discuss the value of good team coordination and leadership, there is no 
standardization or objective assessment of the human factors of a code team’s response and  
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performance. Based on the current evaluation tools it is evident gaps in team performance 
metrics exist. A metric needs to be able to identify gaps in performance so training can be utilized 
to target deficient performance areas.  
 
Table 1  
 
Comparison of current team performance evaluation tools 
 
Team Emergency Assessment Measure (TEAM) 
 Description 
• A rating system consists of 11 items that are rated from 0 to 4 with a 12th 
scale of 0 to 10 overall global rating of the team’s performance 
 Potential Benefits 
• Contains and overall team rating 
• Specific for team evaluation during resuscitation 
 Possible Drawbacks 
• Lacks a specific communication category  
The Observational Skill-Based Clinical Assessment Tool for Resuscitation (OSCAR)  
Description 
• Rates communication, cooperation, coordination, monitoring, leadership and 
decision-making on a scale of 0 to 6 separately for three distinct group 
members of the team 
 Potential Benefits 
• Developed from and extensively validated tool used in the operating room 
setting  
 Possible Drawback 
• Does not evaluate teamwork as a behavior, nor is it a behavior they defined as 
a non-technical skill  
• Does not assess the team as a whole  
Mayo High Performance Teamwork Scale (MHPTS) 
 Description 
• Rates leadership, teamwork, communication and adaptability using 16 
categories rated from 0 to 2 (never or rarely to consistently, respectively). 
 Potential Benefit 
• Can be used as a crisis resource management tool in a variety of situations  
 Possible Drawbacks 
• Not specific to teams during resuscitation 
 
Summary 
While tested metrics for code team evaluation exist there are still gaps in measurments. 
TEAM has been tested and validated however it is still lacking. It utilizes a subjective Likert scale, 
no timing-related behaviors are included, and coordination of communication and information 
transfer is not clear. OSCAR is lengthy with key timing, coordination, and leadership aspects all 
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measured separately. Focus on the team’s interactions in a metric is paramount and failure to 
evaluate a team’s performance as a whole makes its ability to measure the team behaviors in  
context difficulty.The MHPTS has little use as a specific metric for teams in resuscitation and the 
dichotomaous checklist is too medicine focused with no true cognitive process measurements.  
Identifying the gaps in current measurement tools and offering a viable option that includes a 
metric for team performance and areas in which training should be targeted.  
Training Code Teams  
Theories of Team Cognition and Code Teams 
In order to identify a training strategy that best suits ad hoc code teams, two of the main 
theoretical perspectives of team cognition, which provide a foundation for understanding team 
learning and effectiveness, must be examined; shared mental models and interactive team 
cognition. Salas, Cooke, and Rosen, (2008) define team cognition as the relationship between 
processes, such as, learning, planning, reasoning, and decision making, as they occur at the 
team level and will be discussed in the following section of this dissertation. Also reviewed is the  
literature relevant to team performance and training for code teams, which, will allow us to 
postulate a possible training strategy. We will begin by defining and examining code teams in the 
context of the science of team training using the main perspectives of team cognition. 
Shared Mental Model/Team Mental Models 
Shared mental models (SMM), also referred to as team mental models, in the medical 
setting have their foundation in the aviation industry (Carbo, Tess, Roy, & Weingart, 2011).  The 
SMM as it relates to team cognition gained prominence in the medical literature with the 
introduction of a collaboration between the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) 
and the Department of Defense (DOD) called the TeamSTEPPS (Alonso et al., 2006). Shared 
mental models suggest the dependence of team performance with individual team member 
knowledge and that cognition of the team is simply a sum of each team member’s knowledge. Its 
plausibility of use in ad hoc code teams with varying roles and knowledge makes it a questionable 
perspective on effective teamwork.  
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Interactive Team Cognition  
 To contrast the shared mental models theory of team cognition, interactive team  
cognition (ITC) describes team cognition as more than just a sum of individual team member  
knowledge (Cooke, Gorman, Myers, & Duran, 2013). It proposes three components of team 
cognition and suggests that team cognition is an activity, that it should be measured and studied 
at the team level, and that it is inseparably tied to context. Team member knowledge is still an 
important part of effective team performance, but ITC implies that when attempting to improve a 
team’s performance, training strategies need to focus on how the team functions and how it 
performs as a unit, not just the combined knowledge and skill factors of its individual members. Its 
focus is on the interactions of the team rather than individual knowledge. Interactive team 
cognition goes further to imply that with well-coordinated communication and information 
processing, not all the team members need all of the information. The team just needs a way to 
pass the information to the team member who needs it, ITC implies that team training should 
address this team interaction. Applying the science of human factors with its focus on decision-
making, task analysis, team science, and simulation is a novel approach to code team training 
with potential to improve patient outcomes.   
 Leadership Training  
 The role of the team leader during a code blue team response is known to be pivotal, as 
the leader is the person responsible for the distribution and coordination of subtasks, ideally using  
clear and explicit communication (Fernandez Castelao, Boos, Ringer, Eich, & Russo, 2015). It 
has been demonstrated that the lack of good leadership may impact the team’s overall 
performance and possibly lead to poor patient outcomes (Cooper, 2001; Hunziker et al., (2011). 
The Hunziker et al., (2011) research further determined five behaviors for effective CPR 
leadership: (1) consider situational demands, (2) facilitate contributions of the non-leading team 
members, (3) ask problem related questions, (4) keep hands-off, and (5) promote exchange of  
information. Leadership training can be done effectively in a short period of time as shown in  
research utilizing only a two-hour training session (Mahramus, Penoyer, Waterval, Sole, & Bowe,  
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2016). Six code teams consisting of physicians, nurses, and respiratory therapists were studied in 
a pretest and posttest experiment. It was determined a shortened 2-hour training session had  
similar results as longer training programs. The authors stated the reasoning behind two-hours 
time frame were the challenges of scheduling all the different disciplines, time constraints, and 
cost. Interestingly, code team members in this study stated that they perceived teamwork during 
codes as insufficient in the areas of training, leadership, and communication.  
Because ad hoc medical teams and aviation teams share similarities, such as: team 
centered activities, some procedures they perform are risky, and their work is often performed in 
a time-pressured situation, it is hypothesized that similar training tools and strategies could be 
used to train code teams in simulation and improve teamwork. The importance of team training 
has been recognized in the domain of aviation. This influence and its implications on the training 
of code teams will be discussed in the next section.  
Communication Training from Crew Resource Management 
Communication and coordination training are common in the field of aviation and are 
directly aligned with interactive team cognition. Crew resource management (CRM) is a type of 
training program utilized in aviation. Its communication training focuses on establishing common 
language, establishing interpersonal relationships, and predictable behavior patterns.   
On average, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) estimates there are approximately 
7,000 aircraft over the United States at any given time. In 2014, there were only 29 accidents 
involving 121 aircrafts with zero fatalities (2014 NTSB US Civil Aviation Accident Statistics, 2015). 
To accomplish this level of safety, air traffic controllers, pilots, co-pilots, and ground crews work 
together as a team. The work they do is multifaceted and cannot be accomplished by a single 
individual team member alone. Sharing the cognitive load allows for improved team work and 
desirable outcomes.  
The idea of developing training tools for medical teams similar to those used in aviation to 
improve safety has been suggested. Flin & Maran, (2004) focused on medicine’s tendency to 
utilize ad hoc teams, similar to teams in commercial aviation. Despite the fact that resuscitation of  
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a patient is a team endeavor, the medical knowledge and skills needed to perform resuscitative 
efforts are taught and practiced at the individual level during ACLS and CPR training courses  
(Morrison et al., 2013). The need for team training is unmistakable.  
Aeronautical crew training approach principles should be able to be implemented in the 
medical realm when training ad hoc code teams. Using the non-technical skills identified as 
fundamental components of CRM training, Flin et al., (2003) described system components and 
placed then into four categories: cooperation, leadership and managerial skills, situation 
awareness, and decision making. These categories can be used to depict how aviation team 
training can be integrated in the training of medical teams. Commercial pilots and crews in both 
the United States and Europe participate in mandatory team training. Many large airlines use 
team-training packages that were developed to assist aircrews in error prevention, identifying 
errors, and how to diminish the consequences of errors (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999).  
Communication Training in Medicine  
 Human error, more specifically, communication error, is the number one cause of error in 
both aviation and medicine (Brindley & Reynolds, 2011). Verbalization of intent, assertiveness, 
confirmation of task completion utilizing a “call out” are additional behaviors that improve 
communication during a code event which, may improve team performance (Dunn et al., 2007).   
Training sessions do not need to be involved and lengthy. Studies have demonstrated brief 
communication training can be effective in improving overall ad hoc team performance. Seventy-
three code team members consisting of physicians, nurses, and respiratory therapists were 
studied in a pretest/posttest experiment that demonstrated only two hours of teamwork training 
can improve team performance (Mahramus et al., 2016). The code team members even stated 
that following this brief training their perception of teamwork during codes was improved. The 
study also confirmed a shortened 2-hour training session had similar results as longer training  
programs, with the actual educational portion of this study lasting only 45 minutes. 
Continuing to examine the idea that team training can be done in abbreviated sessions  
as well as the idea regarding the influence communication breakdowns have on a majority of  
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adverse medical events, a prospective study observed the impact team communication training  
had on ad hoc trauma teams performing resuscitation in the simulated settings (Roberts et al., 
2014).  Of the 17 team and leader behaviors targeted, 15 showed improvements after brief 
training. Researchers did observe communication breakdowns such as; the team leader 
frequently did not identify him/herself and vague orders were not clarified. This is a fundamental 
component in CRM training and should be done by all team leaders.  
Overview and Conclusion 
After analyzing and considering on all to the training types, ad hoc code team dynamics, 
and the logistical constraints of training an entire code team, it seems plausible that a training 
combination of leadership and communication may be a reasonable option. Despite the evident 
challenges involved in training a code team it is evident a formal team training strategy and 
process is needed. Providing essential information can be challenging and requires practice. 
Relevant portions of fundamental information need to be communicated by the code team leader 
within seconds of the team’s arrival. All of this is done while the team begins their primary survey 
of the patient and other tasks associated with the resuscitation. The code team leader can be 
trained to orchestrate this process of information transfer and redirect the messenger if irrelevant 
data are provided. Currently, there is no formal training process described in the literature that 
trains the leader to efficiently transfer information during the code blue process and will be the 
target of this research. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE ASU-MAYO TEAM PERFORMANCE METRIC 
Introduction  
Because outcome measures of code team effectiveness based on mortality rates at 
discharge and reduction of cardiac arrest occurring outside of the ICU are not a true 
representation of the team’s overall performance, it was central that this metric differs from the 
current metrics used in that it must integrate aspects of team performance in order to target 
behaviors specific to code team performance. Development of a metric targeting specific errorful 
team behaviors that fall into teamwork categories will allow for the scoring of them during a 
simulated code blue events (SCBEs). In turn, this may allow for the identification of performance 
gaps that can be targeted for training interventions.  This behavior-oriented metric will also 
provide specifc feedback for post-code debriefs. To accomplish this portion of the research we 
worked with the Mayo Clinic Hospital in Phoenix, Arizona and utilizes videos of SCBEs from their 
code blue drill program.   
Research Question 1 
 Can we develop a code team metric that identifies specific performance gaps? 
Methods  
Participants 
Participants in videos were employees of The Mayo Clinical Hospital who voluntarily 
participated in a SCBE as part of Mayo’s Code Blue pilot program and included physicians, 
nurses, respiratory therapists, and pharmacists. All participants signed Mayo’s consent form for 
authorization to photograph, videotape, or film employee, resident, student, or trainee. The SME 
used in this and subsequent experiments all have more than 10 years critical care experience 
running codes and evaluating and training code team leaders.  
Study Design and Setting 
 A retrospective examination was conducted on ten SCBEs that occurred at the Mayo 
Clinic Hospital in Phoenix, Arizona from June 6, 2013 thru November 10, 2015. Each of the codes 
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consisted of similar patient scenarios following a sequence of: the patient developing 
unresponsiveness, need to call a code blue, patient requiring resuscitation, and the  
electrocardiogram (ECG) displaying a shockable rhythm. The SCBE lasted eight minutes with a 
debriefing period following the code. It should be noted that the debriefing portion of the simulated 
code was not evaluated in this portion of the research. Two of the ten codes were used as a 
baseline for metric category development that was used to develop the preliminary version of the 
ASU-Mayo metric. The errors in this preliminary version of the ASU-Mayo metric fell into four 
categories relevant to team performance: leadership, role clarity, workflow and coordination, and 
communication.  
While watching the two baseline codes with subject matter experts (SMEs) it was noticed 
they commented on the errors that occurred during the code and not what the teams did 
correctly. Therefore, knowledge was elicited from the SMEs as they watched the two SCBE 
videos to determine what errors should be included in the metric that would be relevant to team 
performance. The SMEs re-evaluated and iterated on the preliminary version of the metric to 
develop a secondary version.  This secondary version of the metric was then developed and used 
to evaluate the two baseline SCBEs, which resulted in the elimination of errors determined to play 
little to no role in overall team performance.  Additionally, components of the metric were 
reinforced with timing factors from the “Get With the Guidelines – Resuscitation” to ensure 
components proven to improve patient outcomes during resuscitation were taking into account 
(Cunningham, Mattu, O’Conner, & Brady, 2012). The secondary version of the metric was 
developed into the current version of the metric, which in this research, will be referred to as the 
ASU-Mayo Team Performance Metric (AMtPM) (see Appendix E).  
 Unlike the additive team measurement scales utilized in TEAM, OSCAR, and the 
MHTPS, the newly developed AMtPM is a scoring tool that subtracts points for errors the team 
commits occurring by the team members in the four subcategories: leadership, role clarity, 
communication, and workflow and coordination. The subcategory scores are added up to get a 
total team performance score, with 100 points being the highest score a team can receive during 
the SCBE evaluation.  
 
26 
Code Evaluation and Scoring Procedure 
 The procedure involved in code evaluation and scoring took place in two steps: 
evaluation and scoring using TEAM, OSCAR, MHPTS, and the AMtPM and, second, the SME 
evaluation of the overall team performance of the codes.  
TEAM, OSCAR, MHPTS, and the AMtPM Procedure. The eight SCBEs were each 
viewed three times and then on the forth viewing they were each scored using TEAM, OSCAR, 
MHPTS, and the AMtPM. Because TEAM, OSCAR, and the MHTPS all utilize different rating 
systems resulting in optimal team performance scores producing varying ranges, the score the 
SCBE received following evaluation were converted to a 100-point scale so it could be compared 
to the AMtPM. 
Subject Matter Expert Evaluation Procedure. Four SMEs were asked to view the eight 
codes only once, continuously, without pausing or rewinding. The SMEs scored categories of 
overall teamwork, leadership, role clarity, workflow and timing/coordination, and communication 
using an overall 1 to 5 rating with 1 being very poor and 5 being excellent. The overall scores 
were converted to a 100-point scale so they could be compared with the other four metrics.  
Results  
 The results indicated that the new AMtPM was highly correlated with MHPTS (r (6) = .71), 
TEAM (r (6) = .84), and OSCAR (r (6) = .89) metrics as well as the ratings of the subject matter 
experts (r (6) = .88) (see Table 2).   
Table 2 
Correlations of the team performance metrics and SME ratings for eight codes 
 ASU-Mayo Metric MHPTS TEAM OSCAR 
SME 
Rating 
AMtPM 1     
MHPTS 0.71 1    
TEAM 0.84 0.92 1   
OSCAR 0.89 0.80 0.85 1  
SME Rating 0.88 0.84 0.96 0.88 1 
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The AMtPM identified that of the total 128 errors that occurred across the 8 codes, 33 
leadership errors occurred, 38 communication errors occurred, and 42 workflow/coordination 
errors occurred (see Table 3). The identification of the subcategories, which led to the weakest 
overall team performance, determined the targeted team behaviors for which training 
interventions would be introduced. Evaluation of the scores in the subcategories of leadership, 
role clarity, communication, and workflow and coordination using the AMtPM indicate that 
leadership and communication errors were related to lower overall team performance scores. 
With the difficulties involved in the coordination of training for ad hoc code teams, focusing on a 
communication the code team leader could use is a viable training option. For the four highest 
performing teams, leadership errors occurred six times with communications errors occurring 16 
times as compared to the four lowest performing teams with 22 leadership errors and 22 
communications errors (see Table 4). 
Table 3  
Overall team performance as it relates to number of errors  
Code 
Number 
Total Number 
of Errors 
Number of 
Leadership 
Errors  
Number of 
Role Clarity 
Errors  
Number of 
Workflow/ 
Coordination 
Errors  
Number of 
Communication 
Errors  
Code 1 19 5 3 7 4 
Code 2 18 7 2 4 5 
Code 3 7 2 1 2 2 
Code 4 15 3 3 5 4 
Code 5 14 3 0 5 6 
Code 6 12 1 1 6 4 
Code 7 24 7 2 8 7 
Code 8 19 5 3 5 6 
Totals 128 33 15 42 38 
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Table 4  
Correlation of leadership and communication errors in highest and lowest performed codes   
Code Number 
Total Number of 
Errors  
Number of   
Leadership Errors  
Number of  
Communication 
Errors  
Highest 4 
Scoring Codes    
Code 3 7 2  2  
Code 4 15 3 4 
Code 5 14 3 6 
Code 6 12 1 4 
Total 48 6 16 
    
Lowest 4 
Scoring Codes    
Code 1 19 5 4 
Code 2 18 5 5 
Code 7 24 7 7 
Code 8 19 5 6 
Total  80  22  22 
 
Conclusion  
 Before we attempted to improve training for code teams, it is crucial we delineated the 
problems associated with code team performance. The AMtPM is an objective measurement of 
team performance based on leadership, role clarity, communication, workflow, and coordination, 
and overall team performance along with measurements aligned with the “Get with the 
Guidelines” standards for resuscitation from the American Heart Association. It is a novel and 
robust team assessment tool that we propose will facilitate the building of high-performance code 
teams.  
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By incorporating the ability to measure coordination of team process, communication, 
information transfer, and leadership, the AMtPM is a code team evaluation tool that facilitated the 
identification of specific performance gaps in teamwork that the current tools, such as TEAMs 
lack of communication category and OSCARs overall lack of team evaluation as a whole, fail to 
recognize. Using the AMtPM determined that the main weaknesses in team performance fell into 
the categories of leadership and communication, which in turn, drove the development of the 
communication model and leadership training that will be used in the subsequent research 
sections of this dissertation.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE COMMUNICATION MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
Background  
Communication can be defined as the transmission of information between one person to 
another person or group and achieves four purposes: (1) building and maintaining team structure, 
(2) coordination of team processes, (3) information exchange, and (4) facilitation of interpersonal 
relationships (Robinson, 2016; Fernandez Castelao, Russo, Riethmüller, & Boos, 2013). These 
four purposes were taken into account when developing the AMtPM. Moreover, the metric’s use 
in the evaluation of eight codes determined that leadership and communication errors resulted in 
the lowest scores in team performance. Although role clarity is important, most hospitals use ad 
hoc teams and with assigned roles based on licensure level with the physician typically 
designated as the code team leader. The development of the communication model was intended 
to convey only the essential information that needs to be communicated for the team to be 
effective. Issues, such as clarity of communication, flow pattern, and content are important and 
will also be incorporated into the communication model (Bogenstätter et al., 2009; O’Brien, 
Haughton, & Flanagan, 2001).  
Overall Approach to the Communication Model Development 
Using team performance scores and the AMtPM described in chapter 3 of this 
dissertation the patterns of communication utilized in the four highest performing teams were 
used to establish the ideal pattern of communication and its essential components.  Using an if-
then communication strategy demonstrated to improve team performance in a synthetic 
teammate study developed by Demir et al., (2015) we developed a communication model 
applicable for use in the simulated code environment by the CTL. This communication model 
included the essential information that must be communicated to and from the CTL with 
contingencies related to the if-then coordination of communication and tasks necessary to 
promote optimal team performance.  
  
 
31 
Research Question 2 
 What is the essential information communicated during codes and who communicates to 
whom and when in high performing code teams during a simulated code blue event?  
Hypothesis 1 
 Content lacking and ineffective communication patterns during a SCBE result in weak 
team performance and ultimately poor patient outcomes in the absence of formal team leader 
training.  
Methods 
Video Review  
Using the same eight codes described in Chapter 3 for the metric development, a 
retrospective re-examination and evaluation of the codes was utilized to determine the essential 
information content and patterns utilized by the top four scoring code teams.  
Communication Content and Pattern Determination  
Following re-examination of the codes it was determined the communication content 
present in the four highest scoring codes included: code team leader identifying him/herself upon 
entering the room, the CTL standing at the foot of the bed, patient history determination 
happening immediately upon code team arrival and included inquiring about the ABCs, CPR 
monitoring throughout the code, establishment that advanced monitoring is in progress, and 
timing cues correlating with shock delivery or medication administration. Also observed was the 
use of the situation, background, assessment, recommendation (SBAR) technique by the CTL. 
This manner of talking out loud to the room, periodic review of quantitative data, and double-
checking crucial pieces of information are all signs of effective team communication (Hunziker et 
al., 2011). The code team member that the CTL communicated most frequently with during the 
code was a code team RN.  
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 Communication content and patterns observed in the four lowest scoring codes were: 
code team leaders failing to identify themselves upon entering the room, orders originating from 
multiple team members, monitor placement not in the line of site of the CTL, multiple 
microconversations occurring with no direct feedback given to the CTL relating to the patient’s 
condition, and confirmation of task completion not being verbalized to the CTL.  
Communication Model Development 
 Based on the re-evaluation of the eight codes a code blue communication model draft 1 
was sent to the SME for revision (see Appendix F). Two SME where asked to deliberate about 
running the perfect code and what was the essential communication needed for the team to 
perform successfully and asked to revise the draft. The SME revision of first draft of code blue 
communication model can be found in appendix G.   
Results  
Although the SME revision of the first code blue model was very inclusive and detailed, 
the objective of this research was to develop a code blue communication model that focuses on 
whether the CTL can communicate minimal information to improve the team’s overall 
performance. More specifically, the critical part of the concept is to have the leader act as a 
forcing function who could vicariously train the team by requesting information when he or she 
does not get it. The ASU research team and the SMEs revised the SME draft to develop the final 
version of the code blue communication model (see Table 5).  
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Table 5 
 
Final version of code blue communication model 
 
TIMING SENDER RECEIVER COMMUNICATION 
R
ol
e 
C
la
rif
ic
at
io
n 
at
 C
TL
 a
rri
va
l  
Code Team arrival to 
bedside CTL Code Team 
1. Introduces self as code team leader 
2. Clarifies who bedside RN is 
Im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
 
up
on
 C
TL
 
ar
riv
al
 
Ideal communication  Code RN CTL 
1. Bedside RN must give a brief history, 
code status, and confirm advanced 
monitoring is established 
 Contingency CTL Code RN 
IF: Bedside RN does not immediately 
give the CTL a brief history, code status, 
and confirm advanced monitoring is 
established  
THEN: CTL must directly ask the 
bedside RN for the information 
W
or
kf
lo
w
 a
nd
 C
oo
rd
in
at
io
n 
 
Within 30 seconds of 
arrival to code CTL Code Team 1. Asks about ABCs 
Contingency 
Time to first assisted 
ventilation must by 
<= 1 minute CTL Code Team 
IF: No one person is performing CPR or 
performing bag mask ventilating upon 
arrival of CTL 
THEN: CTL must direct code team 
member to immediately perform CPR 
and the RT to bag the patient 
Once monitoring is 
established CTL Code Team 1. Asks for ACLS therapies as indicated 
Contingency 
Time to first shock 
must be <=2 minutes 
of event recognition 
CTL Code Team 
IF: Medication or shock delivery is 
delayed more than 10 seconds after 
identification of rhythm  
THEN: CTL must directly as pharmacist 
or RN do deliver the meds and/or shock 
*constant feedback* CTL Code Team 
Asks if there are any problems, so CTL can 
troubleshoot or delegate task to another 
person, keeps team on task, should be in 
SBAR format 
R
es
ul
ts
 
*constant feedback* Code Team CTL 
Identifies improvement or deterioration 
1. Clarifies ROSC/stabilization of ABCs 
2. OR clinical worsening 
Contingency CTL Code Team 
IF: Code team does not clarify 
ROSC/stabilization of ABCs OR clinical 
worsening 
THEN: CTL must clarify disposition (i.e. 
transfer to ICU, need for more advanced 
therapies, discontinuation of efforts, 
etc.) 
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Conclusion 
An identifiable leader with good communication skills, the ability to distribute tasks, gather 
information, and maintain an overview without getting involved in practical code tasks is essential 
for a code team leader to be effective. Contrary, a lack of detail and sparse communication 
containing nonessential information can be problematic. Therefore, a code team leader’s ability to 
effectively communication and elicit communication from other team members when needed all 
while maintaining attention on the overall situation and managing the team was the focus of the 
targeted training in this part of the research. This also aligns with the conclusion reached 
following a review of training strategies and theoretical components of team science.  
Superficially, the communication model seems procedural in nature. However, the 
model’s ability to facilitate the sharing of the minimum necessary information does not limit a 
specific response and the directives the CTL gives following the received information will depend 
on the patient’s current status. Adaptability in a code team is essential because variability exists 
in clinical situations that may influence patient outcomes. In the next study training of the CTL to 
use the model will be done. Then we will determine if use of the model during code events can 
subtly training the other team members.  
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CHAPTER 5 
TRAINING AND EVALUATION OF THE CODE TEAM LEADER 
Background 
Teams may be ad hoc but a prepared communication model with modifiable elements 
may help the team leaders improve the communication structure and flow for the entire team. The 
ad hoc nature of the teams accompanied by the logistical restrictions of training the entire code 
team suggests the foremost influence on the team’s performance may exist in the role of its 
leader. Training the CTL to act as a forcing function, or the individual on the team that 
coordinates the passing of information and manages the team’s interactions, is an idea that is 
currently unpublished in the code team training literature.  
By definition a forcing function is “any management device or tool used to limit user 
errors by prohibiting specific actions without prior use of necessary safety procedures”( forcing 
function, n.d.). It has been used in medicine in certain technical areas. An example of a forcing 
function is the need for a practitioner to enter a patient’s vital signs and allergies before the Pyxis 
system will dispense medication for that patient.  
A forcing function has also been used in medicine as a safety mechanism to help prevent 
inadvertent administration of the medication vincristine that when given intrathecally typically 
leads to death (Reddy, Brown, & Nanda, 2011).  Using a forcing function as a way to improve 
computerized orders regarding patient restraints has also been studied with researchers finding 
an improved variability in restraint orders (Griffey, Wittels, Gilboy, & McAfee, 2009).  However, 
some felt using the technology in this matter could have unintended and catastrophic outcomes 
(Bisantz & Wears, 2009).  
Using the CTL as a forcing function in the context of a SCBE is intended to be a training 
strategy to improve communication flow and train patterns of interaction that would transfer 
essential information at the proper time to prevent team errors. Therefore, this could improve 
overall team performance by ensuring proper communication and actions take place. With this 
approach, the team leader’s request of information from code team members could subtly train  
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them by forcing the transfer of relevant information at the proper time. Subsequently, the next 
time the team member performs they would give the information at the correct time without 
needing to be asked for it.  
Methods  
Participants  
 Ten participants that were currently not a part of the hospital’s code team were recruited 
by an attending physician to participate as a CTL in a simulated experiment regarding a code 
blue event. The physician in charge of recruiting asked the prospective code team leaders 
participants questions from the simulated code blue questionnaire to aid in the division of the 
groups based on years of experience, current practicing level, training, and PGY level (Appendix 
H). Based on the responses to the questions asked during the recruitment process, five CTL 
participants were placed in the control group and the other five were place in the trained group 
(see Table 6). The intentions of the group divisions were to equate experience level across 
conditions. The subject matter experts used to develop the training and code blue communication 
model were excluded from participating as a CTL in this study. Two of the scheduled CTL 
participants, one physician assistant (PA) and one nurse practitioner (NP) were unable to 
participate due to patient care responsibilities. Four additional non-leader code team members 
were recruited to participate in the experiment and included two ICU nurses, one respiratory 
therapist, and one simulation nurse educator, all of who had code team experience. They 
participated in their usual roles during all eight of the codes (one for each of the 8 CTLs) and 
were unaware of the research objectives. Participants, with the exception of the simulation nurse, 
as she is a paid staff member of the simulation lab, were compensated with gift cards. All 
participants signed Mayo’s consent form for authorization to photograph, videotape, or film 
employee, resident, student, or trainee. 
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Table 6 Demographics of code team leader participants  
Control Group 
Leaders 
Trained Group 
Leaders 
CTL 1 
MD for 3 years 
Internal Medicine 
CTL 5 
MD for 3 years 
Internal Medicine 
CTL 2 
PA for 12 years 
Hospital Medicine 
CTL 6 
MD for 2 years 
Internal Medicine 
CTL 3 
MD for 2 years 
Internal Medicine 
CTL 7 
MD for 2 years 
Internal Medicine 
CTL 4 ran Code E 
MD for 1.5 years 
Internal Medicine 
CTL 8 
NP for 1.5 years 
Cardiology 
 
Video Equipment and Setting 
All SCBEs were videotaped using Mayo’s B-line system video capture of simulations and 
took place on a predetermined date in the simulation lab.  
Common Training  
 All recruited participants in this study possessed the ACLS certification as well as had 
attended Mayo’s fundamentals of critical care support (FCCS) training (Na, 1999).  
Training Manipulation for Trained Group  
 The day before the scheduled code blue experiment, the attending physician responsible 
for recruiting emailed the five participants in the trained code team leader group a copy of the 
communication model with instruction to read it over as much as they would like prior to the day 
of the experiment. No further instructions were given. Prior to the trained leaders entering the 
simulation room on the day of the experiment they received a “cheat sheet” shortened version of 
the code blue communication model to use during the SCBE (Appendix I). 
Running of the Simulated Code Blue Events for the Control Condition and the Trained Condition 
 The code team leaders were scheduled to run the codes in 15-minute blocks with the 
actual simulation lasting eight minutes and the order they ran their codes is listed in Table 7. The 
additional non-leader participants remained the same for all eight codes. Five different scenarios  
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were used (Code A – E) to mitigate the possibility the additional non-leader code team members’ 
performance improved with each subsequent code team leaders. All five scenarios contained a 
shockable cardiac rhythm but a different patient scenario. In addition, to control for non-leader 
experience over the eight sessions, an attempt was made to balance trained and control teams 
across the sessions.   Thus, in each of the first four and last four sessions there were two trained 
and two control teams.  Also for the three scenarios that were repeated (B, D, E) two (D, E) were 
experienced the second time by control teams and one (B) by trained teams. Following each 
code, the code team leader participant was asked questions 1-9 of the simulated code blue 
questionnaire by the researcher with the trained participants also being ask question 10 (see 
Appendix H). 
Table 7 Order the codes were run  
 
Code Team Leader 
Control or Trained 
Leader Code Scenario Ran 
6 Trained A 
1 Control B 
5 Trained B 
2 Control C 
7 Trained D 
8 Trained E 
4 Control E 
3 Control D 
 
Results 
 Six of the participants were female (3 control, 3 trained) and two were male (1 control, 1 
trained). All participants held the ACLS certification an average time of approximately 4 years. All 
eight codes run by control and trained leaders were scored using the AMtPM to determine the 
total number of errors the control and trained groups committed. (see Table 8). In the teams with 
the trained leader, leadership errors occurred four times with communications errors occurring six 
times as compared to the teams with the control leaders that committed eight leadership errors 
and eleven communications errors. Each leader participant’s responses to questions 4-10 on the 
post simulation questionnaire that related to the running of the codes are listed in Table 9. 
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Table 8 
Overall team performance as it relates to the number of errors for the control and trained CTLs 
Code Team 
Leader 
Total 
Number of 
Errors 
Number of 
Leadership 
Errors 
Number of 
Role Clarity 
Errors 
Number of 
Workflow/ 
Coordination 
Errors 
Number of 
Communication 
Errors 
Control CTL      
CTL 1 9 2 0 3 4 
CTL 2 7 2 0 1 4 
CTL 3 4 2 0 0 2 
CTL 4 5 2 0 2 1 
Total Errors for 
Control 25 8 0 6 11 
Trained CTL      
CTL 5 3 0 0 1 2 
CTL 6 3 2 0 0 1 
CTL 7 3 1 0 1 1 
CTL 8 5 1 0 2 2 
Total Errors for 
Trained 12 4 0 4 6 
 
Table 9 
Questions and responses to the post simulation questionnaire  
Question 4 Do you typically perform as a team leader in real codes? If not the team 
leader what is your role? 
 Responses from Control Group  
CTL 1 My typically role is a bystander, not the leader. 
CTL 2 I will act as the team leader until the code team arrives.  
CTL 3 No. I usually do CPR. 
CTL 4  I would act as the leader only until the code team gets there, then I would just 
watch and help if I am asked. 
  Responses from Trained Group 
CTL 5 I usually act as the leader. 
CTL 6 I usually act in a supportive role. I don’t typically take charge and run the code. 
CTL 7 I usually am just a bystander. 
CTL 8 I am usually the leader in a real code.  
  
Question 5 Have you performed as a team leader in simulated codes? If not the team 
leader what is your role? 
 Responses from Control Group 
CTL 1  Never acted as the leader. Mostly just act as a bystander and will do what the 
critical care doc asks me to do.  
CTL 2 Yes. We I run simulated codes I act in the role of team leader. 
CTL 3 I have acted as the leader but my role varies in the simulations stuff I have done. 
CTL 4 I have acted as the leader in simulation.  
 Responses from Trained Group 
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CTL 5 I haven’t run any simulated codes as a physician. I was a nurse before I went to 
med school and ran a few back then. 
CTL 6 I have not run any code in simulation before. 
CTL 7 In sim codes I will act as the code team leader.  
CTL 8 I have acted as the lead and the RT when we run sims. 
    
Question 6 Have you had any formal team training? 
 Responses from Control Group  
CTL 1  No. 
CTL 2 No. 
CTL 3 No. 
CTL 4  No. 
 Responses from Trained Group  
CTL 5 No. 
CTL 6 No. 
CTL 7 Yes. I did a two-week leadership camp in high school, but that was a long time 
ago. 
CTL 8 No. 
  
Question 7 What went well with today’s simulated code? 
 Responses from Control Group  
CTL 1  The communication between the code team was very good.  
CTL 2 CPR was started early; the team was supportive and had good communication. 
CTL 3 Everyone was calm and well trained in his or her role.  
CTL 4  I think everyone was clear what his or her role was in the code.  
 Responses from Trained Group 
CTL 5 I think always talking is important during patient care. 
CTL 6 All the team contributed to running the code when I asked them for help or talked 
out loud about things. 
CTL 7 I think everyone was clear on their role and what to do.  
CTL 8 I think we worked together during the code. 
  
Question 8 What could have been improved in this patient’s care? 
 Responses from Control Group 
CTL 1  I could have shocked the patient sooner. I think if I had a better understanding of 
the ACLS algorithms it would have been better.  
CTL 2 I should have shocked the patient sooner. I also need to review my ACLS 
protocols.  
CTL 3 Nothing. 
CTL 4  I need to review my ACLS protocols.  
 Responses from Trained Group 
CTL 5 I think always talking is important during patient care. 
CTL 6 I wish I asked for more about the patient’s history. I forgot to ask what the patient’s 
code status was. 
CTL 7 I could have shocked the patient sooner. I also don’t think I did enough 
investigation regarding the cause of the patient’s cardiac arrest.  
CTL 8 More patient history would have helped.  
  
Question 9 Were there any delays in therapy? If so, provide a description of the delay. 
 Response from Control Group 
CTL 1  I should have shocked the patient sooner. 
CTL 2 I needed to shock sooner. It was a shockable rhythm and I don’t know why I 
delayed.  
CTL 3 I think I gave the epi a little late but everything else was fine.  
CTL 4  Yes, I delayed shocking the patient.  
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 Responses from Trained Group  
CTL 5 No. 
CTL 6 No. 
CTL 7 I should have shocked sooner.  
CTL 8 I think I should have given epi sooner and asked for intubation quicker than I did. 
Maybe I should have shocked sooner. 
  
Question 10 Do you feel the script helped you perform better as the code team leader? 
Did the cheat sheet help? 
 Responses from Trained Group  
CTL 5 Yes, it helped. I did like the cheat sheet. It reminded me of what to do while I was 
waiting for the 2-minute CPR cycle to end. 
CTL 6 Yes. It jogged my memory about running codes. I did not look at the cheat sheet 
but it was comforting to have it if I needed to look at it. 
CTL 7 The script was helpful but I didn’t use the cheat sheet. It was a distraction during 
the code.  
CTL 8 Maybe marginally useful. I didn’t use the cheat sheet. 
 
No errors in role clarity were reported; likely due to the nature of the experiment in the 
setting of the simulation lab where the participant is a code team leader. To further determine if 
the communication model helped improve the CTL performances in the areas targeted by this 
research, the control group and trained group requests for information as it relates to the 
communication model with the contingencies was compared (Table 10). All of the control group 
leaders and one of the trained group leaders (CTL 8) failed to identify themselves as the code 
team leader. This requirement is directly aligned with CRM training used by pilots. In clinical 
setting with the ad hoc nature of code teams this should always be done which is the justification 
of why it is tied to the first contingency in the communication model. If the bedside RN is unsure 
of the code team leader there may be a delay in communication transfer of vital patient 
information. The control group and trained group CTL 8 did walk in and ask, “what’s going on” but 
did not directly ask for a brief patient history or direct the request to a specific code team member 
which, caused confusion with the non-CTL members of the team as to who should answer the 
question and what components of the history should be given. Although the sample was very 
small an independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the errors that occurred in the 
control groups versus the trained group. Although there was not a significant difference in the 
scores for control group (M=6.25, SD=2.22) and the trained group (M=3.5, SD=1) conditions; p = 
0.06, these results are promising considering such a small sample was used.  
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Table 10 
Use of the code blue communication model for the control and trained CTLs 
 
 
Code Team 
Leader and 
Overall Score 
 
Introduced Self 
as CTL/Properly 
Positioned self 
 
Delay in 
Communication 
of Brief Patient 
History 
 
Asked 
For Code 
Status 
Delay in 
Shock/Directed 
delivery of 
medication or 
Shock Delivery 
Control: 
Followed Path 
Similar to 
script Trained: 
Followed 
Script 
Control CTL      
CTL 1 
92% 
No/ 
No 
Yes No Yes/No No 
CTL 2 
94% 
No/ 
No 
Yes No Yes/No No 
CTL 3 
96% 
No/ 
No 
No No No/Yes Yes 
CTL 4 
95% 
No/ 
No 
Yes Yes, 3 
minutes 
into code 
Yes/No No 
Trained CTL      
CTL 5 
97% 
Yes/ 
Yes 
No No No/Yes Yes 
CTL 6 
97% 
Yes/ 
No 
No Yes No/Yes Yes 
CTL 7 
97% 
Yes/ 
No 
No No Yes/Yes Yes 
CTL 8 
94% 
No/ 
No 
Yes No Yes/No No 
 
There were many commonalities between the control and trained code team leaders. 
Only two (one control, one trained) asked for the patient’s code status. While this could be a 
result of the fact the simulation involved a code response, it is important the patient’s code status 
in communicated before any resuscitation begins. Seven of the eight code team leaders practiced 
internal medicine. The control and trained team leaders were evenly matched for comparison. 
However, due to the loss of two participants CTL 2 (control) and CTL 6 (trained) we unevenly 
matched in years and level of practicing with CLT 2 being a PA practicing for 12 years and CLT 6 
a physician with 2 years of practicing. Also, with the exception of high school leadership camp for 
trained CTL 7, none had any formal team training. Four (two controls and two trained) out of the 
eight stated they act as the leader in real codes, but would relinquish that role once the code 
team arrives. Five of the CTLs (three controls and two trained) have acted in the role of team 
leader in simulated codes with trained CTL 6 never having run any simulated codes. Five of the 
CTLs (three controls and two trained) felt they delayed shocking the patient or that shocking  
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sooner could have improved the patient’s care. Per the “Get with the Guideline” standards the 
first shock must be delivered within two minutes of identification of a shockable rhythm. This time 
frame is included in the AMtPM under the workflow and coordination error category and of the 
eight scored simulated codes in this experiment, five of CTLs (three controls and two trained) 
shocked the patient after the two-minute mark. The time spent reviewing the communication 
model varied from 5 minutes, 10 minutes, 30 minutes, to about an hour for CTL 5, 8, 6, and 7 
respectively. The most common errors made by the two groups during SBCEs are illustrated and 
compared in figure 3. 
Figure 3 Common errors committed during the SCBE  
 
Code team leader 4 (control group) asked for feedback regarding his performance in the 
SCBE. The attending physician took him into a private room and debriefed the leader regarding 
their performance. Although debriefing is typically done following a SBCE, it was not part of this 
experiment and no other participants asked for an evaluation and debriefing following their 
performance.  
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Conclusion 
Despite the importance of the 100,000 Lives campaign and its impact on public health, 
few studies have focused on how to train code teams to improve team performance and 
subsequently improve patient outcomes and even less have looked at which training strategy 
would work best for code team leaders. The AMtPM identified the need for a training design 
focused on improving leadership and communication; a topic that is gaining prevalence as an 
important component in the team’s overall performance (Rosenman, Shandro, Ilgen, Harper, & 
Fernandez, 2014). This experiment demonstrated on a small scale the improvement the 
communication model can make on team performance. It also confirmed how logistically difficult it 
is to coordinate training for code teams (Capella et al., 2010). Setting up simulation, obtaining 
time in the simulation lab, recruiting CTL physicians and other code team members, coordinating 
the schedules of SME to observe the codes, score the codes, and debrief the code team 
following the simulated codes, is expensive and time consuming. The time the trained group 
spent on training is minimal compared to the time it would take to train the entire team and offers 
a viable option for training that could improve the entire team.   
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION 
It is clear that caring for acutely ill patients is demanding and resuscitation is a task that 
requires coordination of team members with varying skill sets in an extremely stressful clinical 
environment. Many studies have discussed the negative outcomes of code teams regarding 
unchanged mortality rates and increasing of hospital costs, but few have offered a concrete plan 
to improve the team (Chan et al., 2010; Cretikos & Hillman, 2003; Howell et al., 2012; Karpman et 
al., 2013). The weakness in overall team evaluation seen in the TEAM, OSCAR, and MHPTS 
metrics were remedied with the development of the new AMtPM allowing for the identification and 
training of the code team leader in the areas performance deficiencies were identified. It is 
important to understand the difference between practicing and running a SCBE and the fact that 
actually training teams to perform more effectively during a SCBE requires implementation and 
evaluation of a training strategy.  
Many types of training strategies exist but were not considered to be options for ad hoc 
code teams. When determining the strategy to use when training a code team the challenges 
these teams face needs to be examined in order to establish a viable training option. Training in 
the medical field is typically procedural and done at the individual level despite the fact that 
healthcare providers frequently work in teams. The rigidity of procedural training can cause 
habituation and lead to poor team performance if the situation does not match the original training 
circumstances. Its use as a training strategy for ad hoc code teams that require performance in a 
constantly changing atmosphere makes this type of training highly unlikely to be effective. Cross-
training is another training approach commonly used and normally associated with the shared 
mental model perspective of team cognition. However, with teams that have such varying 
member knowledge (doctors, nurses, respiratory therapist) it seems impractical as an effective 
training strategy in code teams. Applicable in many team performance situations, team reflexivity 
training involves reflection on prior performances, refered to as debriefing, with the intention of 
using those past experiences to improve subsequent performances (Gurtner, Tschan, Semmer, & 
Nägele, 2007).  
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This is a similar concept to self-correction training. Debriefing remains unstructured and its 
influence on training and improving a team’s performance is questionable.  
The role of the code team leader during CPR is known to be pivotal, as she or he is the 
team member responsible for the allocation and coordination of subtasks, ideally using clear and 
unambiguous communication (Fernandez et al., 2008; Fernandez Castelao, Boos, Ringer, Eich, 
& Russo, 2015;  Hunziker, Tschan, Semmer, & Marsch, 2013). Every member of the team knows 
what is expected of him or her. The team roles and responsibilities are predetermined, well 
understood, shared, and upheld. Many training strategies exist and were discussed in the 
dissertation. The decision to train the code team leader in the areas of communication and 
leadership mitigated the challenges of getting together an entire team to train. Furthermore, code 
teams are not usually the same members so training the pivotal member that undertakes the 
leader role is an ideal strategy.  
Strengths and Limitations 
This research focuses on the training of the code team leader and training should be 
instituted for participants who would be leading code teams. This training should include core 
principles of leadership during dynamic time-sensitive situations. Training code teams is a 
challenging task. If training just the code team leader could improve the overall team performance 
in the simulated setting one can postulate that in a real-world code event, improved patient 
outcomes are possible. Also, in events with a large number of people requiring some sort of 
coordinated response, such as the evacuation events following Hurricane Katrina in 2005, 
training a few key people to be leaders in evacuation effort is a realistic task whereas training 
thousands of people is not. Also a possible area in which a benefit of CTL training could be 
demonstrated is in facilities with infrequent cardiac arrests or a lack of a simulation center needed 
to conduct SCBE training on a regular basis (Puttha et al., 2015).  
This research was an applied study in a medical setting using physicians and advanced 
practitioners. This limited participation pool significantly affected our sample size. Two of the 
participants were called away to take care of patients, which further limited our sample size. Also  
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challenging was finding time to run our codes in the busy simulation center at The Mayo Clinic. 
However, even with the small sample size and minimal time spent training, an overall team 
performance was seen in the trained group. 
Not evaluated in this research was the debriefing following the SCBE which has been 
demonstrated to improve a team’s performance (Mahramus et al., 2016). A structured format 
following the code could offer areas of team deficiencies that could be targeted during training. 
Simulated codes were scheduled in the simulation lab and the CTL groups and non-leader 
members were not evaluating following an overhead “code blue” activation requiring them to 
respond.  Geographical spread of areas of response for code teams may influence code team 
performance.  
Future Direction and Implications  
 As previously stated the debriefing portion of a typical SCBE was not part of this 
experiment. Future studies should target this area because often the same team that takes care 
of a patient during a code blue response has to continue resuscitation if the patient survives and 
is transferred to the ICU. This may make it difficult for the team to spend adequate time to 
participate in a comprehensive debriefing exercise is the real-world setting.  
Critical care physicians are typically the practitioners that lead code teams. But what 
happens to the patient in the interim of code blue call and code team arrival? Training internal 
medicine physicians and other practitioners to function as a code team leader may offer an area 
that could improve the care of the patient prior to the code team’s arrival and is an area of 
research that should be investigated. When asked, 49.3% internal medicine residents surveyed 
felt they lacked the training needed to run a code (Hayes, Rhee, Detsky, Leblanc, & Wax, 2007). 
Targeting residency programs for training could be an area of future study. Since early 
defibrillation has been demonstrated to improve patient outcomes and three of the four untrained 
CTL delayed the first shock, training focusing on the practitioners that treat the patient while 
waiting for code team arrival could improve patient outcomes (Zafari et al., 2004).  
Current members of the code team that participate as the code team leader were not  
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used in this study. However, they could still benefit from training with the communication model.  
The addition of perturbations, or changes in the normal process of the SCBE, could prove to 
improve the adaptability of the entire team and improve overall performance and has been 
demonstrated in the aviation setting. Gorman, Cooke, and Amazeen, (2010) compared three 
training strategies (procedural training, cross training, perturbation training) to determine which 
was more effective in training an adaptive team. The results of their experiments revealed that 
perturbation trained teams performed better in two of the three critical test experimental missions 
and as good as the cross-trained teams in response to novel events. Although the setting for this 
experiment was simulated uninhabited air vehicle (UAV) missions, because perturbation training 
may produce more adaptive teams, its application to training an ad hoc code team in simulation  
may prove useful for improving outcomes. Adaptability in a code team is essential because 
variabilities and changes in patient condition exist in clinical situations and may influence patient 
outcomes.  
Conclusion  
Team member knowledge is still an important part of effective team performance, but 
interactive team cognition implies that when attempting to improve a team’s performance, training 
strategies need to focus on how the team functions and how it performs as a unit, not just the 
combined knowledge of its individual members. The development of this communication model 
allows for the training of the entire team through the prompts from a trained code team leadeer. I 
hope this research will provide code team members richer feedback on performance, generate 
quantitative assessments of the value of SCBEs, and make simulated training exercises a more 
efficient training tool. The ultimate aim of building high-performing code teams would be improved 
patient outcomes following cardiac arrest. In this study, the trained code team leader teams 
showed superior performance that the control teams with an average of only 26 minutes spent on 
training with the communication model. Though the sample size is limited due to constraints of 
the hospital environment, the time that the trained leaders spent is minimal compared to the time 
it would take to train the entire team. There is limited data in this study but it offers a very  
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optimistic promise of what this strategy could offer given the reduced training time needed for 
team performance improvement. This type of training strategy should be studied in the future with 
larger groups of trainees. 
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al., (2011) 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Mayo High Performance Team Scale (MHPTS) 
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Use the following scale to rate the team on each dimension: 
0 = never or rarely 1 = inconsistently 2 = consistently 
Please rate conservatively.  Most teams that have not worked extensively together do not 
consistently demonstrate many of the qualities described in the scale. 
Always rate the following: 
 1 A leader is clearly recognized by all team members 
 
 2 The team leader assures maintenance of an appropriate balance between 
command authority and team member participation 
 3 Each team member demonstrates a clear understanding of his or her role 
 
 4 The team prompts each other to attend to all significant clinical indicators 
throughout the procedure/intervention 
 5 When team members are actively involved with the patient, they verbalize their 
activities aloud 
 6 Team members repeat back or paraphrase instructions and clarifications to 
indicate that they heard them correctly 
 7  Team members refer to established protocols and checklists for the 
procedure/intervention 
 8 All members of the team are appropriately involved and participate in the activity 
 
 
Items 9-16 may be marked “NA (not applicable)” if no situations occurred in which these types of 
responses were required. 
 9 Disagreements or conflicts among team members are addressed without a loss of 
situation awareness 
 10 When appropriate, roles are shifted to address urgent or emergent events 
 11 When directions are unclear, team members acknowledge their lack of 
understanding and ask for repetition and clarification 
 12 Team members acknowledge-in a positive manner- statements directed at 
avoiding or containing errors or seeking clarification 
 13 Team members can call attention to actions that they feel could cause errors or 
complications 
 14 Team members respond to potential errors or complications with procedures that 
avoid the error or complication 
 15 When statements directed at avoiding or containing errors or complications do not 
elicit a response to avoid or contain the error, team members persist in seeking a 
response 
 16 Team members ask each other for assistance prior to or during periods of task 
overload 
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APPENDIX D 
Check List from Andersen et al., (2010) 
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APPENDIX E 
 
ASU-MAYO team performance Metric 
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For each bulleted item count the number of instances of the error 
(Code team leader = CTL, N = number of errors) 
Teamwork SCORE = aSUB+bSUB+cSUB+dSUB 
 
a. Leadership errors [SUBSCORE = 25-N] 
• CTL did not verbally identify him/herself upon arrival to the code  
• CTL did not position himself properly to direct code  
• CTL did not ask bedside RN for report upon arrival to the code  
• CTL failed to take charge   
• CTL does not update team if situation with the patient changes  
• Team was not kept on task by CTL 
• CTL allowed micro-conversations to interfere with the code  
b. Errors in role clarity [SUBSCORE = 25-N] 
• Team members were unsure of CTL 
• Team members were unsure of their responsibilities during the code  
• If CTL change occurred, the change was not verbalized  
• Team member delayed in completing a task  
• CT member performed an incorrect task  
c. Workflow and coordination errors  [SUBSCORE = 25-N] 
• Initiation of chest compressions was delayed following the establishment of 
pulselessness  
• Bed not positioned properly prior to code team arrival by bedside RN 
• CT arrival was > 2 minutes from Code Blue overhead call  
• Chest compressions were delayed for > 10 seconds  
• First shock was not delivered within 2 minutes of identification of VF or pulseless VT 
• IV/IO Epinephrine or Vasopressin was not administered within the first five minutes of the 
event  
• Placement of backboard was delayed > (need a time here) 
• Time on chest for team member performing CPR was inappropriate  
• Change of team member performing chest compressions was awkward  
• Universal precautions were not followed by team members  
• All nonessential equipment was not removed from patient area  
d. Communication errors [SUBSCORE = 25-N] 
• Code status was not verified and communicated to code team members  
• ECG rhythm was not verbalized  
• Medication dose and route was not verbalized  
• Medication allergies were not verbalized  
• Instructions were not clearly verbalized  
• Completion of a task was not verbalized  
• Instruction not repeated back to CTL to ensure they were heard correctly, if questioned  
• Patient status and report not given when new CT members arrived 
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APPENDIX F  
 
Draft 1 of the CODE BLUE Communication model  
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Timing  Sender  Receiver  Essential Communication 
Code team 
arrival to 
code  
a. Code team 
leader  
b. Bedside RN 
taking care of 
the pt when 
event started 
c. Code team 
leader  
a. All involved in 
code  
b. Code team leader 
 
 
 
c. Bedside RN 
taking care of the 
pt when event 
started 
a. CTL introduces himself as 
the leader and confirms 
who the bedside RN taking 
care of the patient  
b. Gives a quick overview of 
the events leading up to the 
code call.  
c. IF not immediately given by 
bedside RN THEN the code 
team leader asks for a 
quick overview of the 
events leading up to the 
code call.  
Patient 
connected 
to the ECG 
a. Code team 
leader 
b. Bedside RN 
 
 
 
c. Code team 
leader 
a. Team member 
performing CPR 
b. Code team leader 
 
 
 
c. Bedside RN 
taking care of the 
pt when event 
started 
a. Instructs team member to 
stop CPR while the rhythm 
is interpreted.  
b. Once patient is connected 
Bedside RN communicates 
to the code team leader 
what rhythm is the patient 
in.  
c. IF the bedside RN cannot 
answer, THEN the code 
team asks anyone that can 
answer.  
Communicate the next step 
based on rhythm and 
ensure it was completed by 
verbal verification  
2 minutes 
into code  
a. Code team 
leader 
a. Bedside RN 
taking care of the 
pt when event 
started 
a. Asks the AMPLE questions  
If ROSC a. Code team 
leader  
a. Code team RN Transport patient to ICU 
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APPENDIX G 
 
SME revision of first draft of CODE BLUE Communication Model  
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TIMING SENDER RECEIVER COMMUNICATION 
IN
TR
O
D
U
C
TI
O
N
 
Code Team 
arrival to 
bedside 
CTL Code Team 
1. Introduces self as leader 
2. Clarifies who Code RN is 
3. Asks who bedside RN is 
CTL Code RN Ensures code cart is present and Code RN is establishing advanced monitoring 
FI
R
ST
 
IM
PR
ES
SI
O
N
 
R
O
LE
 
C
LA
R
IF
IC
AT
IO
N
  
CTL Code Team 
Asks about ABCs 
If any not present: ensures one person is 
doing CPR and RT is bag mask ventilating 
Bedside RN CTL Tells brief history of events leading up to code 
CTL Code Team 
Delegates a member to do more investigation: 
Get more history, pull up EMR (allergies, 
meds, labs, notes, code status), look at tele, 
find out where primary team and family is 
PR
O
BL
EM
 ID
EN
TI
FI
C
AT
IO
N
 
Once 
monitoring is 
established 
Code RN CTL 
1. Tells vitals (if CPR not in progress) 
2. If doing CPR - states if there is a shockable 
rhythm (while compressions are held) 
CTL Code Team 
Asks for ACLS therapies as indicated 
1. Meds from pharmacist or RN 
2. IV access from another RN or CCT 
3. Defibrillation set-up from another RN 
During ACLS 
preparation 
RT at head CTL 
Clarifies if BMV successful 
1. If inappropriate – states change in O2 device 
2. If airway unprotected or BMV inadequate, 
states need for advanced airway 
CTL Code Team 
Clarifies if there is a need for intubation 
1. Delegates code team member to airway 
2. Ensures second RT is setting up 
*constant 
feedback* Code Team CTL 
Notifies of any problems, so CTL can troubleshoot 
or delegate task to another person (i.e. place CVC, 
place IO, call main pharmacy, get difficult airway 
cart, etc.) 
AC
TI
O
N
 ACLS 
(if indicated) CTL Code Team 
Performs ACLS as appropriate 
1. Defibrillation/Cardioversion 
2. Meds 
3. Advanced airway 
*constant 
feedback* Code Team CTL 
Identifies when any therapies are 
unsuccessful/difficult or there is a change in 
clinical status 
FU
R
TH
ER
 IN
VE
ST
IG
AT
IO
N
 
 
CTL Code Team 
Asks for further monitoring as needed 
1. EKG, US/Echo, ABG, labs (delegates 
amongst team members) 
Code Team 
‘Investigator’ CTL 
Tells more pertinent story, labs, tele, diagnostics 
(may be presented sooner if appropriate/ 
available) 
 
72 
*constant 
feedback* Code Team CTL Clearly tell results of diagnostics 
FU
R
TH
ER
 
AC
TI
O
N
 
At any 
appropriate 
time 
CTL Code Team 
Asks for other necessary therapies 
(i.e. Ca, Bicarb, Fluids, Benzos, Narcan, Blood 
product, more vascular access etc.) 
R
ES
U
LT
 
*constant 
feedback* Code Team CTL 
Identifies improvement or deterioration 
1. Clarifies ROSC/stabilization of ABCs 
2. OR clinical worsening 
Dispo CTL 
Code Team 
 
Others 
1. Clarifies disposition (i.e. transfer to ICU, need 
for more advanced therapies, discontinuation 
of efforts, etc.) 
2. Communicates to necessary people (calls 
consultation if needed, speaks to family, 
clarifies dispo with other teams involved) 
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APPENDIX H 
 
Simulated Code Blue Event Questionnaire 
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1. Are you a physician, RN, NP, PA? Do you have a specialty?  
2. How long have you been practicing at your current level?  
3. How long have your held the ACLS certification? 
4. Do you typically performing as a team leader in real codes? If not the team leader what is 
your role? 
5. Have you performed as a team leader in simulated codes? If not the team leader what is 
your role? 
6. Have you had any formal team training? If yes how much? Explain the training. 
7. What went well with today’s simulated code? 
8. What could have been improved in this patient’s care? 
9. Were there any delays in therapy? If so, provide a description of the delay. 
10. Do you feel the script helped you perform better as the code team leader? Did the cheat 
sheet help? 
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APPENDIX I 
 
CODE BLUE Communication Model “Cheat Sheet” 
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Arrival to code Introduces self as code team leader 
Contingency 
IF: Code RN does not immediately give the CTL a brief history, code status, and 
confirm advanced monitoring is established  
THEN: CTL must directly ask the Code RN for the information 
Within 30 seconds 
of arrival to code 
Asks about ABCs 
IF: No one person is performing CPR or performing bag mask ventilating upon 
arrival of CTL 
THEN: CTL must direct code team member to immediately perform CPR and the RT 
to bag the patient 
Once monitoring is 
established 
Asks for ACLS therapies as indicated 
IF: Medication or shock delivery is delayed more than 10 seconds after identification 
of rhythm  
THEN: CTL must directly as pharmacist or RN do deliver the meds and/or shock 
*constant 
feedback* 
Asks if there are any problems, so CTL can troubleshoot or delegate task to another 
person, keeps team on task, should be in SBAR format 
Contingency 
IF: Code team does not clarifies ROSC/stabilization of ABCs OR clinical worsening 
THEN: CTL must clarify disposition (i.e. transfer to ICU, need for more advanced 
therapies, discontinuation of efforts, etc.) 
 
